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1. The Energy Conservatory Port Devices Driver Download For Windows 10 Laptop
2. The Energy Conservatory Port Devices Driver Download For Windows 10 64
3. The Energy Conservatory Port Devices Driver Download For Windows 10 Free

Driver and application software files have been compressed. The following instructions show you how to download the compressed files and decompress them. To download files, click the file link, select Save, and specify the directory where you want to save the file.The download will start automatically. However, an attacker could connect an attacking device to a 1394 port, and then spoof an SBP-2 hardware ID. When Windows detects an SBP-2 hardware ID, it loads the SBP-2 driver (sbp2port.sys), and then instructs the driver to allow for the SBP-2 device to perform DMA.

For Windows version 1803 and later versions, if your platform supports the new Kernel DMA Protection feature, we recommend that you leverage that feature to mitigate Thunderbolt DMA attacks. For earlier versions of Windowsor platforms that lack the new Kernel DMA Protection feature, if your organization allows for TPM-only protectors or supports computers in sleep mode, the following is one DMA mitigation option. Please refer to BitLocker Countermeasures to understand the spectrum of mitigations.

Also users may refer to Intel Thunderbolt 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows 10 Operating System documentation for alternative mitigations.

Microsoft provides third-party contact information to help you find technical support. This contact information may change without notice. Microsoft does not guarantee the accuracy of this third-party contact information.
For more information about how to do this, go to the following Microsoft website:

Symptoms

A BitLocker-protected computer may be vulnerable to Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks when the computer is turned on or is in the Standby power state. This includes when the desktop is locked.
BitLocker with TPM-only authentication allows for a computer to enter the power-on state without any pre-boot authentication. Therefore, an attacker may be able to perform DMA attacks.
In these configurations, an attacker may be able to search for BitLocker encryption keys in system memory by spoofing the SBP-2 hardware ID by using an attacking device that is plugged into a 1394 port. Alternatively, an active Thunderbolt port also provides access to system memory to perform an attack. Note that Thunderbolt 3 on the new USB Type-C connector includes new security features which can be configured to protect against this type of attack without disabling the port.
This article applies to any of the following systems:

• Systems that are left turned on

• Systems that are left in the Standby power state

• Systems that use the TPM-only BitLocker protector

Cause

1394 physical DMA

Industry standard 1394 controllers (OHCI compliant) provide functionality that allows for access to system memory. This functionality is provided as a performance improvement. It enables large amounts of data to transfer directly between a 1394 device and system memory, bypassing CPU and software. By default, 1394 Physical DMA is disabled in all versions of Windows. The following options are available to enable 1394 Physical DMA:

• An administrator enables 1394 Kernel Debugging.

• Someone who has physical access to the computer connects a 1394 storage device that complies with the SBP-2 specification.

1394 DMA threats to BitLocker

BitLocker system integrity checks mitigate unauthorized Kernel Debugging status changes. However, an attacker could connect an attacking device to a 1394 port, and then spoof an SBP-2 hardware ID. When Windows detects an SBP-2 hardware ID, it loads the SBP-2 driver (sbp2port.sys), and then instructs the driver to allow for the SBP-2 device to perform DMA. This enables an attacker to gain access to system memory and search for BitLocker encryption keys.

Thunderbolt physical DMA

Thunderbolt is an external bus that allows for direct access to system memory via PCI. This functionality is provided as a performance improvement. It enables large amounts of data to transfer directly between a Thunderbolt device and system memory, thereby bypassing the CPU and software.

Thunderbolt threats to BitLocker

An attacker could connect a special purpose device to a Thunderbolt port and have full direct memory access through the PCI Express bus. This could enable an attacker to gain access to system memory and search for BitLocker encryption keys. Note that Thunderbolt 3 on the new USB Type-C connector includes new security features which can be configured to protect against this type of access.

Resolution

Some configurations of BitLocker can reduce the risk of this kind of attack. The TPM+PIN, TPM+USB, and TPM+PIN+USB protectors reduce the effect of DMA attacks when computers do not use sleep mode (suspend to RAM).

SBP-2 Mitigation

On the previously mentioned website, refer to the 'Prevent installation of drivers matching these device setup classes' section under 'Group Policy Settings for Device Installation'.
The following is the Plug and Play device setup class GUID for an SBP-2 drive:

d48179be-ec20-11d1-b6b8-00c04fa372a7

On some platforms, completely disabling the 1394 device may provide extra security. On the previously mentioned website, refer to the 'Prevent installation of devices that match these device IDs' section under 'Group Policy Settings for Device Installation'.
The following is the Plug and Play compatible ID for a 1394 controller:

PCICC_0C0010

Thunderbolt Mitigation

Beginning with Windows 10 version 1803, newer Intel-based systems include built-in kernel DMA protection for Thunderbolt 3. No configuration is required for this protection.

To block a Thunderbolt controller on a device running an earlier version of Windows, or for platforms that lack kernel DMA protection for Thunderbolt 3, refer to the 'Prevent installation of devices that match these device IDs' section under 'Group Policy Settings for Device Installation' on the previously mentioned website.

The following is the Plug and Play compatible ID for a Thunderbolt controller:

PCICC_0C0A

Notes

• The drawback of this mitigation is that external storage devices can no longer connect by using the 1394 port, and all PCI Express devices that are connected to the Thunderbolt port will not work.

• If your hardware deviates from current Windows Engineering Guidance, it may enable DMA on these ports after you start the computer and before Windows takes control of the hardware. This opens your system to compromise, and this condition is not mitigated by this workaround.

• Blocking the SBP-2 driver and Thunderbolt controllers does not protect against attacks on external or internal PCI slots (including M.2, Cardbus & ExpressCard).

More Information

For more information about DMA threats to BitLocker, see the following Microsoft Security blog:

Windows BitLocker Claims For more information about mitigations for cold attacks against BitLocker, see the following Microsoft Integrity Team blog:

The third-party products that this article discusses are manufactured by companies that are independent of Microsoft. Microsoft makes no warranty, implied or otherwise, about the performance or reliability of these products.

This section describes the class-of-device (CoD) registry subkeys and entries that apply to the Bluetooth driver stack.

'COD Major' and 'COD Type' Values

Original equipment manufacturer (OEMs) can use the COD Major and COD Type values to indicate the Class of Device for a Bluetooth-enabled Windows device. After the Bluetooth class installer sets the Class of Device based on these registry values, a remote device can determine whether it is connecting to a portable computer, a desktop computer, a phone, and so on.

The registry path to the COD Major and COD Type values is:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetServicesBTHPORTParameters

Note that setting these values changes the Bluetooth Class of Device for the system, regardless of which Bluetooth radio may be attached. You can set the COD Major and COD Type to DWORD values as defined for the Class of Device field values in the Bluetooth SIG Assigned Numbers.

The Bluetooth profile driver, BthPort.sys, reads the COD Major and COD Type values to determine how it should respond to a device inquiry. These values affect only the COD_MAJOR_XXX and COD_XXX_MINOR_XXX bits of the Class of Device. The COD_SERVICE_XXX bits are not affected by this registry entry.

If the COD Major and COD Type values are not set or are set to invalid values, the Bluetooth class installer will set these values to COD_MAJOR_COMPUTER and COD_COMPUTER_MINOR_DESKTOP, respectively.

Scanning Parameterization Settings

The Energy Conservatory Port Devices Driver Download For Windows 10 Laptop

Profile drivers can specify scanning parameters settings for their device(s) in their profile driver's INF file to tailor to the specific needs of a given device scenario.

You can override the default system scanning parameters by providing one or more of the following scanning parameters listed below into the AddReg directive. More information on how to use this directive can be found in INF AddReg Directive.

The Energy Conservatory Port Devices Driver Download For Windows 10 64

Note

The Energy Conservatory Port Devices Driver Download For Windows 10 Free

Changes to scanning parameters make a global impact on the performance of the Bluetooth stack. Making changes to scanning parameters programmatically is not permitted. Using Low Duty Cycle scanning parameters that are too aggressive can not only have a negative impact to the available bandwidth for other Bluetooth Low Energy connections, but also for Bluetooth BR/EDR connections.